Tigers and Ms - oh, my!

For some, 2008 was to be a year of vindication - the year when the culmination of a multi-year rebuilding plan finally bore its fruit. Of course, there are always pessimists and naysayers - but for a couple of AL teams, 2008 was supposed to be a pivotal year. The Tigers and Mariners have some interesting parallels, as well as some stark differences. But, each team won 88 games in 2007. Each team went out and acquired a key piece or two to (hopefully) put them over the top. So, what happened? Why did these two teams end the season as the WORST and 3rd worst teams in the American league?

Is it really simply that BOTH clubs were horribly managed? Were both clubs ridiculously inept at talent assessment? Was the extent of the swoon from these two clubs predictable -- or avoidable?

Similarities: In 2007, each team won 88 games and finished second in their division - while finishing further ahead of the 3rd place team than they finished behind the first place team. The Tigers finished 2nd in runs scored (887), but only 9th in runs allowed (797). Overall, they were one game shy of their pythagorean projection.

Seattle finished 7th in runs scored (794) and 10th in runs allowed (813), an astonishing 9 games ahead of their pythag. However, the club suffered an inordinate number of blow-out losses, primarily due to a particularly horrid bottom of the rotation. One mathematical model indicated that after adjusting away the blowout loss abberation, the team was closer to an 85-win team.

Detroit had been 'rebuilding' for over a decade when they finally got serious and started basically from scratch in 2003. They dumped every high priced vet they could and let their prospects flounder to the tune of 119 losses with historically bad offense and defense simultaneously. But, in 2004 both offense and defense improved drastically and the Tigers became a nearly average team overnight, winning 72, with a run differential of only 827-844.

An easy way to view the progress of the Tiger rebuilding program is to simply look at their OPS+ and ERA+ figures beginning with their 43-win disaster in 2003:

Detroit peaked at .702 in DER, (3rd in baseball in 2006), before dropping to 12th in 2007 and 24th in 2008. And this is why individual defense is so troublesome to assess. The defensive teams in 2006 and 2007 were basically identical, except Chris Shelton was replaced by Sean Casey at 1B. Casey is generally regarded as a decent glove. Was it age or injury that caused the plunge? Not likely? The team had a 10 point spike upward in offense with the same basic lineup, so it is very hard to argue that the defensive physical skills plunged, while the offensive physical skills didn't.

But I believe the above chart is VERY nice at indicating something that is generally subtle and goes unspoken. The club concentrated on making moves to boost the offense - 4 new faces in 2004 resulted in a massive offensive turnaround - a 25 point gain in team OPS+. The following year, they picked up 3 more bats - including Mags. But notice that the offense dropped back to 100. The subtle truth of baseball is that players are "constantly" getting better or worse. Every player is a unit of production which varies from season to season, often in chaotic ways. The Tigers had already put into place a cadre of young arms, and basically stuck with them through the bad times and on into the good. They solidified the rotation in 2006 by adding a grizzled veteran (tm), but got their biggest boost from the emerging rookie, Verlander. They got EXTREMELY lucky in that BOTH of their 2006 pitching additions had stellar seasons, (how often do TWO new pitchers on a team BOTH win 17 games?)

Because of the 2006 results, the 95 wins, the trip to the World Series, they were lauded as an example of a franchise that had finally gotten it right. In truth, they had done a number of things right. They installed their young base, and let it flounder and learn. They made FA moves and trades to plug holes while waiting for the youth to blossom, and when they felt the offense was solid, they turned their attention to defense. When the pitching came thru, they turned their attention back to improving the offense. The real lesson here is that when you reach the point of success on EITHER side of the run scoring equation - you *CANNOT* simply stand pat. You are REQUIRED to make moves to simply stay where you are once you get beyond average. So, an above average offense, (or defense), is not likely to STAY above average without a constant infusion of new talent.

But, Detroit also is a demonstration of a club that is willing to take its lumps in regards to player development of young talent. The rotation foundation was Bonderman, Maroth and Robertson, who were all part of the 2003 debacle. Ultimately, Maroth didn't work out, and Bonderman and Robertson have not turned into the stars that had been hoped for. But it is likely that some of the lumps taken in attempting to develop those guys probably helped in subtle ways with Verlander in 2006 and Galarraga in 2008.

However, even good franchises, who demonstrate success, make plenty of mistakes. After the success of 2006, with an OPS+ of 100 and an ERA+ of 118, the club decided it needed more offense. One of the moves made during 2006 was to replace Chris Shelton, who started fast, and then slumped badly with Sean Casey. Though Casey would only post a 67 OPS+ with Detroit, (Shelton's final number was 106), the 26-year-old Shelton lost his job to Casey anyway. For 2007, the club went out and traded for the 38-year-old Gary Sheffield to DH and maybe play some OF. In short, they did what most franchises do once they've tasted the post-season, they started accumulating "safe" veterans with proven track records.

The problem with this approach is that it can make a team old FAST. In 2006, when looking at the starting 9, the club had 4 "old" players -- Pudge (34), Mags (32), and a middle infield of Polanco and Guillen, (30). This is a team that is not old YET, but is very close to becoming old. The major moves for 2007 were to swap out a 29-year-old DH contingent of Monroe and Thames for the 38-year-old Sheffield. And, of course, Casey was the new 1B, instead of Shelton. The 2007 club had a starting 9 with a SINGLE player under that age of 30, (Granderson). Of course, the offense had a stellar year in 2007, the 110 OPS+ the best in years. But, how much was the age impacting the defense? It's impossible to say for sure -- but it is clear that the defense went into free-fall after 2006.

The 42-year-old Rogers spent most of 2007 hurt, and the young arms stagnated or regressed. But, the club managed 88 wins, so it was easy to believe that if they just tweaked things a bit they could return to the post-season in 2008. That obviously didn't occur. So what happened?

The club traded for Miguel Cabrera and Dontrelle Willis -- giving up a boat load or prospects, including Andrew Miller, Mike Rabelo and Cameron Maybin. Cabrera was a dream pickup -- a 25-year-old who was already a 4-time all-star with 5 years in the majors and MVP votes every season. If there is a good time to risk a lengthy and expensive contract on a player, THIS would be it. Dontrelle, only turning 26, was another young guy with upside, except for the concerns about health.

But, in the end, the Tigers 2008 season went down in flames. The offense was okay, (105 OPS+), but the pitching imploded to an ERA+ of 91. A key point here is to realize that the deal for Cabrera worked largely as intended. Miguel was the centerpice, and Dontrelle was more of a salary acquisition, who had potential upside, (like Lowell getting thrown in to Boston a few years back). The offense was fine. But, because the pitching and defense collapsed, it is easy to view the outcome of the trade as being horrendously bad. In truth, the trade didn't cause the problems for the Tigers -- the problems were already there, and they simply didn't pay attention to their largest problem -- primarily defense.

As for 2009, the Mariners' new management hasn't made any flashy acquisitions like Cabrera, (though the return of Griffey is certainly huge in the minds and hearts of many Mariner faithful). But, I personally believe the focus on defense has the greatest potential for drastic and positive change. It's not because the players added to the roster are actually so much better than what was already in Seattle, but because it is apparently a TRUE team focus.

Detroit saw its DER crash following its surprise success of 2006. I personally believe that the largest part of this is simple desire. The club BELIEVED it had to play defense with all abandon to succeed in 2006. In 2007, coming off their success, they simply lost their defensive fire. The young pitching would get better, Sheffield would provide more offense, so who needs to dive for EVERY gapper anyway?

Nobody is predicting great things for Seattle in 2009 -- (myself included). But, I do believe that if there is a recipe for going from worst to first, the club has a number of items in place that would be prime ingredients for such a souffle. Some young talent that has shown promise, but hasn't broken out yet, (Felix, Lopez, Morrow, Clement, F-Gut). Some grizzled veterans, (Branyan, Beltre, Chavez), but not the kind who feel entitled. And, an emotional catalyst -- Junior.

Everyone understands Griffey's best days are behind him. While Batista jokes about wanting 40 HRs, everyone is in on the joke. But, what if, just for a month, (especially an early month like April or May), Griffey got into "the zone"? What kind of fire is smouldering beneath the surface if a little magic puffs out of Junior's nearly empty bottle? Likely? No. But, ah the dreams of Spring are precisely why phrases like "pitchers and catchers report" stir the excitement of youth in the hearts of those far more senior than Junior.

Good moves sometimes don't work out. Bad moves sometimes do. And sometimes, moves which seem inconsequential end up having startling effects. Go back to 1991. The Braves had gone 65-97 the previous year, and their "big" move was to add Terry Pendleton. Pendleton was a 30-year-old defensive whiz, who was perhaps the worst-hitting 3B in the game prior to 1991. His OPS+ figures from age 24-29 were: 66, 62, 103, 87, 98, 65. He had never hit 20 HRs, had never hit .300 in a full season, had only slugged .400 once in a full season, (.412). He became the MVP, and began Atlanta on its march to an unmatched string of post-season appearances.

Spring is indeed the time of dreams. Let your dreams be big -- and let them be bright -- for you can never tell when they might come true.