Seattle has a new man at the helm. "Z" is the new GM, and with all things related to baseball, it will likely take a lot of trips to the "plate" before a reasonable assessment of his performance can begin to be analyzed objectively. Of course, the pundits and fans are not apt to wait to see how the first 10 or 20 decisions pan out. It is the nature of the fan to try and put value on the immediate move before them. This is not meant as a condemnation of this tendency, just an observation on human behavior. As fans, we are impatient BECAUSE we care about the outcomes.

But effective baseball roster construction is not simply about talent assessment. Certainly, talent assessment helps - but "can't miss" talents routinely miss, while 47th round selections and innocuous throw-ins routinely surprise everyone. Luck plays a large role in the ultimate outcome for any roster. The Yankees spent about 130 million on JUST their offense in 2008, and got a 101 team OPS+ and finished 7th in the AL in runs scored. Has there ever been a clearer example for the phrase, "You pays your money and takes your chances"?

Does that mean the fan is forced to wait to see which players work out and which don't to make an informed decision on how "ept" the new GM might be? In terms of talent assessment, probably. But talent assessment is only a small part of the roster-building process. In pro baseball there are a veritable plethora of additional concerns that factor into every decision. But most fans have little to no knowledge of 40-man roster rules, player option years, free agent compensation picks, etc., etc., etc. And most really don't want to know. The typical fan is Al Davis -- "Just win, Baby!" They really don't much care how.

The slightly more educated fan, who might know a bit about some of these operational rules, is still more likely to ignore them than to consider their ramifications in most cases. Oh, when a youngster is sent back to the minors, they may raise an eyebrow trying to recall just how many more times the club can send the kid down before the kid can say "no." But it's not likely to be a point of interest when examining the 12-player, 3-team deal that just went down. Analysis there is almost always going to focus on immediate value and which prospects have a "real" shot at stardom.

For the fan all of these details really shouldn't be a big deal. For the GM, they should. The GM needs to think about these things with every move, because every move has potential ramifications on every future move. This doesn't mean that these other concerns should supercede the more obvious concerns like talent assessment and contract negotiation -- but they ARE variables in a formula that is vastly more complex than most of us would care to know.

Shopping for players to stock your roster with in MLB is not as simple as shopping for groceries at the local Piggly Wiggly. It's a lot more like trying to get the Malibu Barbie Dreamhouse at 5am on Black Thursday. You've got 30 guys in suits all doing their best to bite, scratch and claw their way to the top of the same display. The fans wail and moan when their GM fails to be the one to get the DreamHouse, (though they are often forgetful when that other GM, who "won" the contest to land the big fish, ends up wishing his line had broken -- think Schmidt or Zito in recent years).

So, what all the above meandering prose is leading up to is this -- ORDER matters. Just like lineup order, you can significantly increase or decrease your final result by good or bad lineup construction. Yes, you could put Babe Ruth leading off, and you'd have a monster of a lead-off hitter who would be getting more trips to the plate. But how many runs would be lost since the bases would so often be empty as he lumbered up to the plate?

In lineup construction, order matters because you KNOW who is coming up next in the lineup. In roster construction, it matters because you don't. If you trade away your #1 spec today, you no longer have that piece at your disposal for a trade tomorrow. Each move holds the potential to decrease OR increase the number of options available in the future.

Having watched many teams rebuild, implode, stagnate, or just plain stink over the years, I've begun to get a feel for what ORDER works in regards to constructing a good roster, that is not only capable of winning, but is capable of winning for several seasons before major renovations are needed. I got to watch the Braves flounder through both the 70s and 80s, and then got to see them excel in the 90s and beyond. I've seen the Marlins appear - win the series, dismantle themselves and then repeat the process. I've seen the Diamondbacks climb expansion team to World Series winner, while the Ms and Astros sputter along for decades without titles. I've seen the BoSox finally remake themselves after nearly a hundred years of failure, and I've seen the Cubs desperately trying (and failing) to do the same.

Lucky for my perspective, the bulk of my major league observations have come during the era of free agency. Before free agency came along, the rules were different, and analyzing the pre-70s successes and failures is of little value. The most obvious repeating pattern in all of this is that teams that successfully rebuild have a strong tendency to BEGIN the rebuilding by dumping expensive productive players, (who still have value), develop or acquire YOUNG (pre-25) better than average talent, and THEN hit free agency or make trades to fill in based on need.

I am not aware of *ANY* case, where a successful rebuilding job BEGAN by signing a high-priced FA to a long-term contract. The Rangers AROD deal resulted in 4 seasons of between 71 and 73 wins, before they managed to unload the contract on the Yankees. They immediately won 89 games since he departed, and haven't won LESS than 75 since backtracking. Nobody could claim that AROD himself wasn't productive during his stay in Texas. But that contract had major implications on every POSSIBLE move the club could take during his stay in the Lone Star State.

What is a strange, and somewhat mystifying reality, even to me, is that there seems to be a stronger trend for teams who DIVEST themselves of expensive FAs to improve drastically in short order. The Mariners jumped from 79 wins to 91 after letting Griffey go. They jumped from 91 to 116 after they let AROD follow the next season. The Phillies let Thome go after 2005, and traded away Abreu during 2006. After failing to make the playoffs for 13 years, they managed to get to the post-season AFTER allowing two or their best hitters to leave, and then won it all in 2008.

It is my belief that BEGINNING a rebuilding process through high-priced, long-term FA acquisitions is almost certainly going to fail. And this near certainty is due to a number of different and subtle factors which are blithely ignored by fans, pundits, (and many GMs). I believe planning to build via free agency is "Planning to Flail". Yes, you can (and probably will), improve your team in the short run, but I believe you inevitably lower the upper ceiling of what can be accomplished by your team. The reasons for this are as follows:

1) Shrinking your options -- When you sign a high-priced FA for a long term contract, the most obvious problem is budget. Each team, (even the Yankees), has only so much money it can spend on its lineup. When you spend $20 million a year for the next 8 years on your FIRST piece (of your 25 man roster), that reduces the amount of money available for ANY purpose for the duration of that contract. You'll have less money available to go after FAs in the future. You're also commiting a body to a specific position on the field. Of course, some positions are easier to fill than others. AROD in Texas was probably the best possible case of attempting to begin a rebuild via FA. AROD was only 25, so Texas was getting his best seasons. He was also at the hardest position to fill. Yet, even in that case, things did not work out.

Of course, once you've filled position X with your megastar FA, if your farm team happens to produce a star at that same position, you've painted yourself into a lose-lose corner. You can force your prospect to learn a new position, (costing time, when you could've been getting benefit from the cheap years), and your clock of how long your prospect is under control is also reduced. Or, you could trade him - but since every OTHER club knows your prospect's value is reduced for YOU, they have little reason to pay full price for him. Then again, having already filled that position, you are not likely to draft talent at that position, which just means you're encouraging yourself to pass over the potential best talent to get inferior talent at a position of need. It's lose - lose - lose.

2) Paying for decline -- the MLB actuarial tables are pretty specific about one thing. PEAK performance for major leaguers occurs around age 27-28. Most people will scoff at this notion, having watched Hall of Famers like Maddux and Clemens and Bonds do incredible things until they are 40. (Of course, Maddux' last really good season was at age 36. The fact that he's still pitching at 42 is to be applauded. But he wasn't remotely close to 'classic' Maddux for the last 6 years he played). Maddux best two seasons by ERA+? (age 28 and 29).

The "sweet spot" for major league production is between age 25 and 30. But, players tend to remain "near" their peak until age 31 or 32. But the rules of MLB for player control and Free Agency are such that "most" players reach FA around age 28/29. They actually hit the open market immediately after they have just peaked. The makes for a VERY dangerous game of chicken. Guess what. Father Time eventually gets everyone, so it's a sucker bet to believe that in THIS case standard rules do not apply.

And a player does not have turn out to be Mo Vaughn for the reality to be true. Mo Vaughn is just a brutally obvious case in point. A series of 150+ OPS+ seasons to age 30 -- followed by 3 years of 119, 115, 113 and retirement. Fred McGriff had a similar plunge from 150+ numbers at 30 to sub-120s in "most" seasons for the rest of his career. But because he continued to play until 40 -- and because of those 10 remaining seasons, he managed to post 140+ OPS+ figures twice, the perception is that he didn't decline precipitously. The perception is wrong.

The decline of star players is often shrouded in a mist of denial. Pudge Rodriguez is one of the best catchers of our generation. He posted a 136 OPS+ at age 32! He hasn't broken 100 since. (Catchers tend to flame out faster and harder). But, when a player drops from 150 production to 120 production, he's still above average - so he is PERCEIVED as continuing to hold the bulk of his value. (If a player drops from 120 to 90, people will tend to notice more readily).

In todays market, the guy who has posted a couple of 150 or higher OPS+ seasons is going to be looking at huge money for a LONG contract. You can expect the contract to last until the late 30s, and eat up 20% of your budget. The problem is that for the first couple of seasons of that contract, your production per dollar ratio is probably okay. But, the further you get into the contract, you're likely paying MORE money for less production.

Jeff Bagwell is a perfect case in point. Bags was 33 in 2001, and had just had his WORST season in almost a decade, (139 OPS+). His two best seasons? age 26 (213 OPS+) and age 28 (178 OPS+). They signed him to a 6-year extension. The contract had INCREASING salary for 6 seasons, (11, 13, 16, 18, 19 -- they bought him out for 7 million the final season). This is pretty standard. Inflation is going to make the dollars worth less over time. So, most long-term contracts grade up like this. But PRODUCTION goes the opposite direction. Sure enough, Bags saw his production go: 135, 128, 115, 94 -- and then he never played again.

The Astros were spending 18 million on a guy posting a 94 OPS+, (though the 'upside' was that he only did that for 39 games). This is effectively moving your worst hitter progressively UP the batting order as his hitting gets worse. This is NOT a rare occurence. Bags, Mo Vaughn, Will Clark, Bernie Williams, Mattingly, Steve Garvey -- the list goes on and on. All-Star production until very early 30s, followed by above average production thru the mid-30s.

But, it's not just about drastically over-paying for modest production. It's more about the opportunity cost. All that money spent on the fading superstar is money that is not available to fill NEEDS. One of the realities of the competitive nature of roster construction is that it is largely an open book. Every competitor has a good understanding of what your team NEEDS - and can therefore drive up the price when you start sniffing around for deals. If you BEGIN a rebuilding plan with a big FA signing, when you're one key move away from completing the job, you simply won't have the budget to get the job done. Ask Texas about life during the AROD days.

3) Poisoning your crops -- One of the problems in making this argument is the tendency of people to compartmentalize data. Free agents are viewed as an entity - and the farm system is viewed as another entity, AS IF they are completely separate and distinct beings with no interaction. The reality is that they are linked in a multitude of ways. The most direct has been mentioned -- when you shove that 1B FA into place for the next 8 years, every 1B on the farm has just lost incentive to continue working hard to develop.

This doesn't mean they roll over and die completely. But when YOU have been passed over for promotion, was your immediate response to say, "Gee, I guess I should work harder?" Or were you more prone to grumble and gripe about the unfairness of the decision, and bemoan the fact that it would be "at least" several years before another such promotion was even possible? Was your first instinct to think about quitting, and perhaps start looking for an employer who might VALUE your abilities? Guess what? Even minor leaguers can read the newspaper.

Of course, this isn't just about the 1B on the farm. This is also about the coaches in the minors. If you've plugged your 1B slot for the next 8 years, how much time are you going to spend with the 23-year-old 1B slugger compared to the 23-year-old CF? The coaches get feedback (and bonuses) for guys that reach the majors. It's in the COACHES' best interest to concentrate on developing the youth that lines up with weak areas on the major league club. In fact, they are probably being directed by the club -- "We really need to plug that gaping hole in left ASAP!"

So, what happens when the A+ manager talks to the parent club and tells them, "Bill, that first baseman we picked up in the 37th round because Jon Lovitz liked something he saw? Well, we changed his stance, and now he's hitting .320 and smacking HRs at a 30-per-year clip!" What happens? The parent club is likely to ask, "So, do you think he might be able to play the outfield?" Instead of gleefully accepting the toy surprise in your box of Cracker Jacks, now you are FORCED to see if you can find somebody who'll swap your decoder ring for their whistle.

4) Creating a Culture -- A common platitude kicked around like a hackysack is that organizations are families, and teams need chemistry, (so long as it isn't related to steroids or amphetemines). When you BEGIN a rebuilding job by going outside the organization, EVERYONE in the organization is devalued. The players, the scouts, the coaches, heck even the peanut vendor. It sends a message that the entire organization is not competent enough to produce our players on its own.

Success breeds success. When a club builds from within there are ramifications beyond the immediate result. When Billy Bob comes up through the system and makes the All-Star team in his 2nd season, EVERYONE in the organization who had the smallest hand in his development gets a feeling of accomplishment. That feeling of being a PART of success is FAR more incentive to work just a little harder for the next one than any amount of money would be.

When the home grown spec succeeds and signs a long-term contract with the club, then ALL the kids on the farm are thinking, "Next year, maybe the year after, that could be me." When you sign the high-priced FA, who grew up on somebody else's farm, the message is clear -- we don't have anyone worth having on our own farm. Gee, what a wonderful way to build comraderie and chemistry.

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Of course, plans rarely come together perfectly. It is effectively impossible to have EVERY prospect work out as you would like. But, this is precisely why free agency CAN be so helpful. AFTER you've managed to assemble a solid core group of young, (and mostly cheap), players, THEN you have a much clearer idea of which holes need plugging that cannot be plugged quickly from within. So, the late-in-the-build FA acquisitions do not have to be disruptive. They can slide onto the roster and become PART of the culture of the organization, instead of DEFINING the culture of the organization.

During the Bavasi era in Seattle, the rebuild BEGAN with the Sexson and Beltre and Ibanez signings. Ibanez, at least, was a homegrown product who boomeranged. All three were power bats (of varying levels). What followed over the next four seasons was a complete and utter absence of any power bat emerging from the Seattle farm system SUCCESSFULLY. This is NOT a coincidence. This is a predictable result of sending a message to your entire farm system that "we won't be needing any power bats for the next few years."

When a few power hitters finally showed up, EVERY ONE OF THEM had a horrible transition to the majors. Clement, Wlad, Adam Jones. They didn't get a taste of the majors until the FAs were nearing the end of their contracts. When they did come up, nobody seemed capable of helping these kids adapt to the majors. Then again, why should anyone on the parent club know how to do this? They haven't actually HAD to do it for half a decade or more. The most successful was the guy shipped to Baltimore.

During the Bavasi era, there was much grumbling and griping about the culture of the organization. Seattle needed to create a culture of winning. Well, if you want to get good at World of Warcraft, then you HAVE to put in the hours, learn the game, and make a lot of mistakes along the way. If you just want to get your name on a list somewhere, then you can purchase an account off e-bay, and have some success very quickly. That doesn't make you a winner -- it's a short-cut that ultimately has a very low ceiling.

It's easy to view this FA acquisition or that FA acquisition as being objectively a plus for the club on a PURELY production-related level. Replacing Richie Sexson with Mark Teixeira WILL be a significant gain in production. And if all you want is to win a few extra games next year, that move makes perfect sense. But, if you head down that path, then what you are doing is "planning to FLAIL". Because each move after that becomes more difficult. Each person in the organization is affected in subtle (and sometimes, not so subtle) ways by that decision. If you want to build an organization on a foundation of "let's take shortcuts", well, that's your choice.

Me? I would prefer to build an ORGANIZATION that is committed to getting the absolute best out of every individual making up the organization. I would prefer to build something that is sustainable. I would prefer to utilize the free agent market to plug holes on a temporary basis when the organization happens to fall short in a specific area. I would prefer to have a much more direct and visible incentive for everyone in the organization to strive for excellence. I would prefer that they understand that excellence from WITHIN the organization will be most vigorously compensated.

Roster construction is NOT about 25 moving parts. It is about 1000 moving parts. And there are no shortcuts to getting those 1000 moving parts moving in sync. It demands time, hard work, and a collective agreement that excellence will be rewarded. Pretending that this can be accomplished quickly and easily is a mindset that only guarantees that it will take longer - or never happen.

To succeed, any organization needs a plan. But it should not be a plan to flail.