A "Confidence Game" is also known as a "con", "flim flam", "scheme", "swindle" or "bamboozle", just to name a few synonyms. For most fans, the 2010 Mariner season feels very much like a "confidence game" -- with great optimism running rampant through the masses back in April, only to have nearly every decision, player and game that followed quickly turn from disappointment to disaster as the year unfolded.

Season-ending retrospectives typically rehash the blame-thrower threads from throughout the season. Most are rarely helpful in adding anything to the discussion. "It's all Z's fault!" "No, it was all Wak's fault!" "No, it was Lincoln & Armstrong!" Sorry, but weren't ALL of those people intimately involved in the 2009 success story that CREATED the rampant optimism for 2010? How does one resolve the fantastically above expectation 2009 results with the dreadfully below expectation 2010 results? Typically, most fans and pundits simply pretend the previous season never existed. Unfortunate - but understandable. It's just not easy resolving the obvious contradiction of such excessively extreme variance in outcomes.

Seattle fans have dealt with a Jeckyll and Hyde franchise since '03/'04. Minus 30 wins. Then plus 6, plus 9, plus 10, then minus 27, then plus 24, then minus 24. The real irony here is that winning and losing by such extreme amounts each year feels WORSE than simply being a bad team year after year. When you're Pittsburgh, working on your second consecutive decade of suckitude, the familiarity alone has value. You can ONLY be pleasantly surprised. Sure - the car may be 10 years old, leaks oil, has trouble starting in the winter -- but you've been through quite a bit together. The roller coaster franchise is HARDER to deal with emotionally. When you have to take the 2011 Fusion you bought a month ago into the shop for repairs, you're gonna have a vastly different emotional reaction than if you have to take your 2001 Geo Metro. It's not the cost, or the inconvenience that triggers the emotion - it's the conflict with expectation.

The 2009 Mariners were a dream that was supposed to be a nightmare and the 2010 Ms were the evil twin. But, it's the end of the year. Aren't we supposed to examine what happened, if for no other reason, so we can potentially avoid the same mistakes in the future? Well, yeah. But, before we go there, the foundation point that I want to emphasize is just how gigantically important EXPECTATIONS are not only in how the fans experience a season - but also how the players and coaches and managers and GMs experience it, too. EVERY play, player, hit, run, error, win and loss is viewed through a prism of expectation.

If Ichiro hits .690, it's a disaster. If Rob Johnson or any infielder named Wilson hits .690, it's acceptable. In most cases, the simple delta between expectation and result determines the joy or anguish felt. But, not always. In certain cases, expecation so overwhelms actual results that sometimes we are unable to really register the result. The result is dismissed (good or bad) as a 'fluke', and the expectation continues to be treated as reality.

The above might be of some use to those who become emotionally overwrought during a bad season - but where I'm heading is not about the fans' experience. It is about the PLAYER experience. Players are human, just like each of us, regardless of the height of the pedestal we may mentally place them on. Just like the fans and the pundits, the players have expectations, too. They have expectations of the behavior and treatment they get from management, other players, the fans. They have expectations of themselves -- in how productive they are supposed to be. They too, have expectations about the outcomes ahead.

In 2009, the expectations were low. Griffey came home for a swan song, in what was widely regarded as a rebuilding season - where improving from 60 wins to 70 would be viewed as a reasonable outcome. But, then a lot of the uncertain production from various roster spots exceeded expectations. Washburn had a career year. The defense went from worst to first. Lopez had a career year. Branyan had a career year. Gutierrez had a career year. Aardsma had a career year. Even Ichiro had a career year.

Instead of 70 wins, the team won 85. But, a lot of that result was a direct or indirect result of the low expectations. There was no pressure on anyone -- rookies or veterans. They just took the field each day, just like you and I go to our jobs - and just having fun getting paid lots of money to play a game loved since childhood.

In 2010, when Cliff Lee was acquired, the entire sense of expectation for the season shifted. While there was some concern about the offense, (mostly because Branyan wasn't re-signed), not only were fans optimistic, but many of the pundits were looking for Lee to push Seattle from 85 to 90 wins and a legit shot at the playoffs.

From a tactical standpoint, the decision to bring Griffey back AND give him a signiciant role was foolhardy. While there might be some reasonableness in expecting players like Lopez and Gutierrez and Aardsma to repeat their career years - Griffey had posted a 95 OPS+ in 2009 at age 39. It was completely unreasonable to expect a palatable result from Griffey's bat - much less playoff-worthy production. And expecting Sweeney to be healthy enough to pick up the slack was equally foolish.

From a fan standpoint, the collapse of Griffey was disappointing. But, I believe, from the PLAYER standpoint, it was much, much, much worse. It's got to be emotionally crushing to watch your childhood star go up day after day after day only to embarrass himself. And after awhile it turns from sadness to anger -- because not only is the Hall of Fame version of The Kid being tarnished with each trip to the plate, but he's also killing rallies each day - on a team that cannot afford to have rallies killed.

From *MY* perspective, it was obvious Griffey didn't belong on the team when Spring Training ended. Then again, MY expectation was that he was done - so, when he had a poor Spring, it confirmed my expectation. For a large chunk of Seattle fans, (and more importantly, for the coaches), the expectation that Griffey was still viable overwhelmed the growing evidence he wasn't. So, how many at bats did it take for the guys on the team to realize that Rob Johnson was a better hitter than Griffey? And HERE is where the "Confidence Game" begins. As Griffey (and the team) realize he is no longer a major league player, the team loses confidence in him. But, the manager continues trotting him out there against each RHP - and continues hitting him 5th day after day. So, in a short span, the team loses confidence in the manager, too.

And, while Griffey is stinking things up, Kotchman after a hot start, cools off and struggles, so the club really feels the loss of Branyan - (magnified by the chasm in the #5 slot) - so confidence in the GM also wanes. The off-season Lee acquisition had raised expectations way high. But, Lee started the year on the DL. So, between Lee on the DL, Griffey sucking, Kotchman slumping, the laughably horrid Eric Byrnes experiment, and the failure of Milton Bradley to produce -- the players confidence that Jack Z was going to bring in the help they needed also likely waned.

Forgotten by most at this point, the club was 11-11 the day before April ended. They then lost 8 in row. Also missed by most is that the 8-19 record in May that killed the season wasn't the fault of the offense. You go back and look at the offensive team totals - May was the HIGHEST scoring month for Seattle, (101 runs), with no more than 86 in any other month. The .667 OPS for the month is also the high mark for the season, (which is certainly condemnation that the offense was dreadful). But, it wasn't dreadful when the season fell apart. The truth is, the PITCHING fell apart in May, as runs allowed jumped from 81 to 130. (The only worse month for run allowance was July, when the club allowed 136 and went 6-22).

The numbers game shows 3 months where starters had ERAs under 4 - (April-3.19; June-3.19; Aug-3.44). The club went 11-12; 14-13; 13-14 in those three months. In the other three months, the starters had ERAs above 4 - and the club went 8-19; 6-22; 9-21; The offense was actually FAR more consistent than the starting pitching. But, the PERCEPTION was that the bullpen was unreliable. In May, the bullpen went 3-7. ("We can't win, because the pen sucks!") Well, starters were 5-12. In point of fact, July was the worst ERA month for the bullpen, (5.76), but they only went 2-4 - while the starters went 12-9, giving the club its only winning month. But, the bullpen pitched its fewest INNINGS in June - because the starters were getting the job done.

So, the club (reasonably) lost confidence in the rotation AND the bullpen. In June, they fought back to actually have a winning month despite all of the distractions - Napgate - Griffey retiring - the Bedard failure to launch. But, right at the end of June, Branyan returns! Lee is pitching lights out, Felix is having a Cy Young season. Vargas looks for real. Fister is pitching great! Jack went out to get some added oomph for the lineup.

The club begins July at 33-44. Yeah, they're 14 back, and the odds of coming back are near zero. But, the club finished a winning month, and was rewarded with some added offense. The club lost two of three at Detroit - which was unfortunate. But, with a 3 game set, at home, against the hapless Royals, this is THE series where the club can potentially turn the year around, gain some momentum, and if nothing else, make a move to get back to .500. The club lost the first game with Felix starting 4-6 in 10 innings. The next game was a 2-3 loss. The final game was 3-7. THAT was the series that ended the season. For the month of July, the starters would go 2-15. The bullpen 4-7. Days later Lee was in Texas and Smoak was in Seattle. The "official" rebuilding of the Mariners had begun. The only oddity was that it took another month before Wak bit the dust.

The last confidence that the 2010 was worth playing ended against K.C. The rest of the season has largely been a long rant about who is to blame for the outcome. Mostly, it was unrealistic expectations. The club didn't have enough talent in the rotation (Bedard never arrived), bullpen, (razed by injury), or lineup, (career years OVER-stated how good the last place 2009 offensive players actually were) to reasonably expect to be anything more than a .500 team. The sequence of events likely exacerbated the underlying weaknesses. But, there was a lot of counting chickens in the pre-season analyses. Bedard was a significant factor in explaining how the Ms "would eventually have" the most dominant rotation in baseball. Instead, the club got a total of 13 starts from Lee and Bedard COMBINED.

The perception of the 2010 roster having 90-win talent was a con game. With Griffey/Sweeney at DH, Kotchman at first, Johnson/Moore catching, Wilson/Wilson at short and Byrnes as the left fielder, the offense was clearly lacking - even before the horrible years from Lopez and Figgins. But, the dogged insistance to continue penciling Griffey into the lineup for 7 weeks turned a heat lamp on milk that was already soured.

If there was a subtle common thread explaining the "mass suicide" of the Mariner offense, I would suggest it was in adding a group of players who were almost universally known to be "weak minded". Kotchman had collapsed after each trade - his defining mental characteristic being a complete inability to handle adversity. Figgins was described by none other than Bill James as someone who is only worthwhile when he feels EXTREMELY comfortable. He was not only in a new town - he was asked to switch to a new position. And, the mental 3 Mile Island of Milton Bradley was beyond well documented.

It is odd that a GM who seemed to be so focused on finding "baseball players" would end up selecting three players with clear histories of inability to handle adversity. The roster as assembled was one that *HAD* to get off to a hot start - (rendered effectively impossible when Lee wasn't available). Maybe if Lee and Felix had both been hurling in April, and the club went 14-9 instead of 11-12 ... in THAT situation, perhaps Kotchman and Figgins fare better ... at least until the first bad patch. Instead, eventually the disease of acceptance of losing infected even Gutierrez, leaving Ichiro and Branyan as the sole regulars immune to the blight of 2010.

So, what happens in 2011? Well, expectations are once again going to be extremely low. There are likely going to be multiple "prospects" in the lineup - Smoak, Saunders ... perhaps even Ackley at some point. Figgins, after a year of adjusting to Seattle, (and not looking at being pinch-hit for by someone with a .400 OPS), will likely have a better season. But, 2011 is going to be viewed as a rebuilding year. Felix viewed as the only real talented arm, and the aging Ichiro the only comfort zone on the offense, (though off-season moves and what the final roster looks like are still likely in flux).

The upside for the future is mostly in the minors, where for a decade, the club has been almost devoid of talent. Today, there are a dozen bodies with varying degrees of potential to be anything from impact players to reasonable emergency fill-ins. Most will fail - as they do in all organizations. But, the numbers game is finally such that the odds that one or two or maybe even three step up and contribute is no longer an optimistic fantasy.

Z did not win on Vargas because he's brilliant. He won on Vargas, because he went and got Vargas, Olson, French and Snell ... giving himself four chances for any one of them to work out. At catcher, the club had Johnson and Moore, but Z went and got Bard anyway. For too many years, the club has been putting all its production eggs in one basket - so when a mistake is made, (Sexson ... Vidro), the club is stuck dealing with the problem for multiple years.

At this point, Gutz and Figgins are the "commitments" that Jack has made. Gutz has a good year and bad year so far - and Figgins had a horrible debut season. But, I believe 2011 will be a likely bounceback year for both. But, when players like Smoak and Saunders and Moore and maybe Ackley are a significant portion of your lineup, the uncertainty means expectations are meaningless. The range of possible outcomes is simply too large to project much of anything.

The only thing that can be said of about the 2011 season with confidence is uncertainty will be high. Smoak, Saunders, Moore and Johnson could take steps forward. Or, they could regress and wash out. The likely result is some combination of success and failure. Of course, Seattle hasn't had any exciting offensive successes out of its farm system for quite some time.

And here is where 2011 becomes a true adventure for fans. Because of the uncertain production at pretty much every position except RF, it will be effectively impossible to have ANY substantive expectation, (good or bad). Oh, the lack of star power will lead many to expect utter failure -- the negative expectations will outweigh positive ones. But, each "don't know" position will be an opportunity to be positively suprised, regardless of how the overall team does. That, we can all be confident in.

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POSTSCRIPT:

The following is not meant to be a theory as to why 2011 might be better - but rather, an assessment of how the lack of confidence of the players may have manifested itself during 2010.

BABIP - (Batting Average on Balls In Play), has become a very popular stat among the stat geeks to point to the "luck" factor in baseball. The outcome of hit or out on balls in play, (excluding strikeouts and HRs), should even out in general, because teams face an aggregate defense that should be roughly average. My view is that it is treated too casually as a purely "luck" statistic, as it is possible to assemble a team of players that "beat" the normal value for legitimate (and repeatable) reasons. Players like Ichiro and Jeter beat the league average BABIP by wide margins every year. Speedy spray hitters do this routinely. If the defense has no idea where the ball is going, it is more difficult to position optimally. League average BABIP is usually around .300. In 2010, it was a good year for defense, as league BABIP was .295.

How did Seattle's offense do? They had a team BABIP of .282. That's 13 points below league average. That is pretty bad. The Blue Jays and Angels were the only teams worse. The knee jerk response would be to blame Safeco. Sorry: Home BABIP: .289 ... Road BABIP: .275. Oh, Safeco certainly cost the team home runs, (35 at home and 66 on the road), but it wasn't the park that lowered the BABIP. Just fyi, the defense had a .267 to .296 home/road split -- so the Seattle defense played almost 30 points better defensively at home.

The point I'm leading up to is that the club didn't have a single month of BABIP at league average. The best month was April (.291). The worst - a disasterous July of .269. (In comparison, the Seattle defense posted impressive .268 and .264 BABIPs in April and September, but had a dreadful .307 in July). I believe that after the 8-game losing streak at the beginning of May, the entire offense lost confidence in itself, and too many plate appearances were approached with a mindset of not screwing up, instead of the mindset of making something happen. With the exception of the psychologically gifted Ichiro, the impact was team-wide, (at least until Branyan got healthy).

Later in the season, when more and more rookies were playing, the landscape is more blurry. The urge to not screw up is obviously common in rookies. But, there is also the error or pressing. I think guys like Johnson and Moore may have been trying not to screw up. The psuedo-rookie of Smoak, I believe, was pressing -- attempting to be Babe Ruth. When he returned, his earlier problems were very obviously behind him.

The key point here is that while the 2010 Seattle offense was legitimately bad, the actual results were significantly worse than one would expect given the talent. Seattle was 21 points below league average in OPS+. No other AL team was more than 10 points away from league average - plus or minus. The 2009 club scored 640 runs. The most pessimistic projections for Seattle in 2010 had them scoring 600. They got 513 -- literally 100 runs behind the next worst team, Baltimore.

They should have been the worst offensive team in baseball. They were. They shouldn't have been 100 runs worse than everyone else. That's a near certain anomaly caused in large part by the circumstance of unrealistic expectation and an ultimately indefensible decision to bring back Griffey in a year that contending was a stated goal. Both circumstances are gone, so the chances of a repeat complete offensive meltdown are miniscule. Oh, the club may still be the worst offensive team in baseball. But, it will be difficult in the extreme for them to score fewer than 600 runs again in 2011. In that, the team can have confidence.